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I investigate whether financial openness leads to financial development after controlling for the level of 
legal/institutional development, and whether trade opening is a precondition for financial opening, focusing 
on Asia. Utilizing a panel encompassing 87 less developed countries over the period 1980 to 2000, I find 
that a higher level of financial openness spurs equity market development only if a threshold level of legal 
development has been attained, a condition prevalent particularly among emerging market Asian countries. 
On the issue of sequencing, trade openness is found to be a prerequisite for successful inducement of 
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1. Introduction 
The Asian crisis of 1997-98 confronted policy makers with the conundrum of financial 
globalization. While more open financial markets can contribute to economic development, it is 
the openness of financial markets that can make developing countries more vulnerable to financial 
disruptions (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001a,b, 2002 and Schmukler 2003).1 
Despite the experience of the 1990’s, East Asian policy makers do not appear to have 
abandoned the path of financial liberalization. Rather, as is best exemplified by the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, they have re-emphasized economic development through more integrated financial 
markets in the region. The progress in financial development has occurred against a backdrop of 
regional trade arrangements. As Pomfret (2005) documents, the Asian currency union also started 
being discussed in the region, signifying the importance of how to sequence liberalization 
policies.2 In sum, the debate is not whether to liberalize, but that of how to liberalize. This study 
attempts to inform that debate. 
A common view is that capital account liberalization leads to the development of financial 
markets that channel funds to borrowers with the most productive investment opportunities.3 
Theory suggests several mechanisms for this occurrence. First, financial liberalization may 
mitigate financial repression in protected financial markets, allowing the real interest rate to rise to 
its competitive market equilibrium (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Second, the removal of capital 
controls allows domestic and foreign investors to engage in more portfolio diversification, thereby 
reducing the cost of capital, and increasing the availability of funds.4 Third, and not least, the 
liberalization process usually increases the efficiency of the financial system by weeding out 
inefficient financial institutions and creating greater pressure for a reform of the financial 
infrastructure, alleviating information asymmetry issues such as adverse selection and moral 
                                                          
1 In this study I do not discuss the merits of capital controls in the context of financial crises. For a review, see 
Aizenman (2002). Kletzer and Mody (2000) survey the debate in the context of “self-protection policies” for emerging 
markets. Ito (2004) investigates the correlation between financial liberalization and the output performance of 
crisis-hit economies. 
2 See Eichengreen (2004) for the arguments about the ingredients for the Asian currency union. 
3 See for instance Leahy, et al. (2001) for OECD-specific results. Klein and Olivei (2001) document the linkage 
between financial development and economic growth for developed countries, and its absence for less developed 
countries. Spiegel (2001) examines an APEC sample, while Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) document the 
fragility of many of these group-specific results. IMF (2001, Chapter 4) surveys both the growth and finance, and 
finance and liberalization literatures. For the most recent review on finance and growth, refer to Quinn, et al. (2002) 
4 See Shultz (1999), Henry (2000), and Bekaert et al.(2000, 2001). 
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hazard (Claesens et al., 2001; Stulz, 1999; Stiglitz 2000).  
The link between financial liberalization and financial development is not unambiguous, 
however. One common argument is that to benefit from more open cross-border financial 
transactions, financial systems need to be equipped with reasonable legal and institutional 
infrastructure.5 Specifically, in economies where the legal system does not clearly define property 
rights or guarantee the enforcement of contracts, the incentives for loan activities can be limited. 
Legal protections for creditors and the level of credibility and transparency of accounting rules are 
also likely to affect economic agents’ financial decisions.6 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (hereafter LLSV, 1997, 1998) and Levine (1998, 2002) show that low levels of 
shareholder rights are associated with poorly developed equity markets (especially in French civil 
law countries), while Claessens, et al. (2002) and Caprio, et al. (2004) find that greater creditor 
rights are positively associated with financial intermediary development. 
The ambiguity can be empirically reconciled by incorporating explicitly the level of legal 
and institutional development. I hypothesize that financial liberalization can lead to financial 
development only if the economic system is equipped with a reasonable level of legal and 
institutional development.  
In this paper, I also examine another oft-discussed issue related to the sequence of 
liberalization, that is, the order of liberalization in goods and financial markets. The prominent 
work by McKinnon (1991) argues that liberalization in the trade sector must precede liberalization 
in the capital account transactions. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that financial liberalization 
can lead to financial development only when the economy is open in both cross-border trade and 
capital flows because the economic openness can lead to weakening the political power of 
incumbent financial institutions to oppose further financial development. Aizenman and Noy 
(2004), while investigating countries’ motivations for capital controls, find that financial openness 
and trade openness are bidirectional though the causality from the former to the latter is found to 
be more pervasive than the other. Given the ongoing debates over the manner in which to 
implement financial and real integration in Asia, I think this question is of central importance. 
                                                          
5 Klein (2005) documents the presence of nonlinearities in growth effects of capital account liberalizations. 
6 For the analysis of legal development on financial development, see Beck and Levine (2004), Claessens, et al. (2002), 
Caprio, et al. (2003), and Johnson, et al. (2002). For a general discussion on the importance of legal and institutional 
foundations for financial development, see Beim and Calomiris (2001). 
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This paper conducts a panel data analysis using the dataset encompassing 87 developing 
and emerging market countries (including 15 Asian countries) and twenty years ranging from 1980 
to 2000. In the econometric analysis, I pay special attention to financial development in the equity 
market sector and attempt to highlight any special attributes of the Asian region. 
The empirical results suggest that a higher level of financial openness contributes to the 
development of equity markets, but only if a country is equipped with a certain level of legal and 
institutional development. This finding is applicable not only to the group of less developed 
countries in general, but also to that of the Asian economies. It can be further surmised that many 
of the Asian emerging market countries have been more successful in reaping the benefits of 
financial liberalization because of their relatively higher levels of legal and institutional 
development. Higher levels of bureaucratic quality, and of law and order, as well as the lower 
levels of corruption, have enhanced the effects of financial opening in fostering the development 
of equity markets for less developed countries in general, while only the absence of corruption and 
a high index of law and order matter for the Asian countries. As for the issue of the sequencing, the 
liberalization in cross-border goods transactions is found to be a precondition for capital account 
liberalization among all the sample groups. When the endogeneity of financial openness is 
accounted for using trade openness as an instrument, it is confirmed that financial liberalization 
leads to financial development. 
 
2. Overview of Financial Development and Financial Openness in Asia 
First, I take an overview of the development of financial markets in less developed 
countries, focusing on the Asian economies. The original dataset includes 108 countries, out of 
which 22 are industrialized countries (IDC), 87 less developed countries (LDC), and 15 Asian 
countries (ASIA).7 See Appendix 1 for the composition of the sample. 
2.1  Financial Development in Asia 
                                                          
7 There is also a subgroup of emerging market countries, EMG. The definition of this group relies upon the 
International Financial Corporation’s (IFC) indices, and refers to the countries which were included in either IFC’s 
Global, Investible, or Frontier Index as of 1995. By this definition, there are 31 EMG countries in our sample. The 
Asian subgroup does not include Japan. Asian EMG refers to the Asian countries that are also categorized as EMG. 
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Drawing on the work of Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000), I use the following four 
financial development variables (FD). PCGDP, the ratio of private credit from deposit money 
banks to the private sector, represents the overall development in private banking markets. While 
this variable is examined for purposes of comparison, the primary focus is placed on the 
development of equity markets development, for which three variables are used as the measures: 
SMKC (stock market capitalization), SMTV (total value of stocks traded), and SMTO (stock market 
turn over ratio). SMKC can be considered as the measure of the size of equity markets and SMTV 
and SMTO as the measure of the activeness of equity markets.8 
Figures 1(a)-(d) illustrate financial development measured in the above variables for 
different subsamples. In addition to IDC, LDC, and ASIA, I also have the subgroups of non-Asian 
less developed countries and Latin American countries for comparison purposes. These figures 
show that the Asian region historically achieved high level of financial development compared to 
other less developed countries. In fact, these countries’ financial development has been as rigorous 
as industrialized countries in both banking and equity markets development. Also, its achievement 
during the 1990s is remarkable despite the Asian financial crisis. 
Table 1 reports the growth rates of the financial development variables. Inspection of the 
table reveals that while during the 1990s, all subsample groups experienced the most rapid 
development in equity markets, measured along several dimensions, including size (SMKC) and 
transactions activity (SMTV and SMTO). This is true despite the retrenchment in the equity 
markets of less developed and emerging market countries during the second half of the decade. 
Again, despite the crisis, the speed of Asian financial development in recent years is striking.  
2.2. Financial Openness in Asia 
In this paper, the extent of financial openness is measured using the capital account 
openness index, KAOPEN developed by Chinn and Ito (2002). Many researchers have used binary 
variables based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration reported in Annual Report on Exchange 
                                                          
8 In this study, I do not look into offshore markets as part of financial development, and therefore, focus merely on the 
development of domestic equity markets. Although we have witnessed that some Asian emerging market countries 
such as Korea and Thailand tried to complement their domestic markets by developing offshore markets and allowing 
foreign investors, mostly hedge funds, to actively engage, there have not developed so much literature regarding these 
issues, mainly owing to the recentness of the development of hedge funds and offshore markets (except for Fung and 
Hsieh, 2001; Brown and Goetzmann, 2001; and Brown et al., 1998). Furthermore, the relationship between onshore 
and offshore funds has not been rigorously investigated (except for Kim and Wei, 2002) due to data unavailability.  
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Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)9 and others such as Quinn (1997) and 
Miniane (2004) have created more delicate measures.10 However, the consensus is that such 
measures fail to fully capture the complexity of real-world capital controls.11 KAOPEN is the first 
principle component of the four IMF binary variables, and higher values indicate greater financial 
openness.  
One of the merits of the KAOPEN index is that it attempts to measure the intensity of 
capital controls, insofar as the intensity is correlated with the existence of other restrictions on 
international transactions. One may argue that the KAOPEN index measures the extensity of 
capital controls because it may not directly refer to the stringency of restrictions on cross-border 
transactions, but to the existence of different types of restrictions. However, measuring the 
extensity of capital controls may be a good proxy to the measure of intensity of capital controls. 
For example, considering that transactions on the current account have often been used to evade 
capital account controls (Edwards, 1999), policy makers can increase the stringency of capital 
controls by tightening transactions on the current account restrictions or other systems such as 
multiple exchange rates and requirements to surrender export proceeds. Another merit of this 
index is its wide coverage (more than 100 countries) for a long time period (1970 through 2000). 
Appendix 2 explains with more details how KAOPEN is constructed. 
One more note must be made about this index. By the nature of its construction, this index 
is considered to be de jure measures on financial openness because it attempts to measure 
regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions. Hence, this index is different from 
price-based measures on financial openness, namely those based on the interest rate parity (UIP or 
                                                          
9 These binary variables are created based on a set of “on-off” clarification, which includes an indicator variable for 
the existence of multiple exchange rates (k1); restrictions on current account (k2); capital account transactions (k3); and 
a variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4). k3 is the one often used for capital 
controls. In 1996, the classification method in the AREAER changed and these four categories became more 
disaggregated as an effort to reflect the complexity of capital controls policies. 
10 The Quinn index is a composite measure of financial regulation and based upon Quinn’s coding of the qualitative 
information contained in the AREAER pertaining to k2 and k3, augmented by information regarding whether the 
country in question has entered into international agreements with international organizations such as the OECD and 
EU. The Quinn index is available for the OECD members between 1958 and 1997, but the coverage for the less 
developed countries is limited to certain years (1958, 1973, 1982, 1988, and 1997). Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) 
created the time series of capital controls based on the recently created disaggregate components in the AREAER. 
However, the time series of the variables only covers years after 1996. Most recently, Miniane (2004) constructed a set 
of indices to measure the intensity of capital controls, based on an approach akin to Johnston et al., but extending the 
data back to 1983 for 34 countries. 
11  See Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), and Edison et al. (2002) for discussions and comparisons of 
6 
RIP) approach such as Cheung, et al. (2003) and Montiel (1995) or those on deviations from no 
arbitrage profits conditions such as De Gregorio (1998). Researchers often refer to these 
price-based measures as de facto measures on financial integration. These two types of financial 
openness measures have their own strengths and weaknesses.12 However, it is almost impossible 
not only to rank the supremacy of these measures, but also to distinguish them. Nonetheless, this 
paper focuses on regulatory aspects of capital account openness.  
Table 2 presents the averages of KAOPEN for the full sample period of 1970 – 2000 and 
each decade for different sample groups. Figure 2 shows the development of financial openness for 
the subgroup of Asia, non-Asian LDC, and Latin American countries. From the table and the 
figure, we can see that the Asian countries are different from other less developed countries in that 
these countries did not halt the efforts of financial liberalization during the 1980s while other less 
developed countries, especially Latin American countries, considerably restricted capital accounts 
during the decade. The Asian countries liberalized capital accounts rapidly in the first half of the 
1990s until the occurrence of the Asian crisis, that led these countries to restrict capital accounts.  
 
3. An Econometric Analysis  
In what follows, I investigate the issues relevant to the sequence of liberalization.  
3.1 The Empirical Specification 
First, I will examine the long-term effect of capital account openness on financial 
development in a model that controls for the level of legal and institutional development. The 
model is specified as: 













i− = + + + + × + +− − − − −5 0 5 1 5 2 3 5 5γ ρ γ γ γ ( ) Γ , 
where FD is a measure of financial development; KAOPEN is a measure of financial openness; X 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
various measures on capital restrictions.  
12 One of the drawbacks of de jure measures on financial openness is that as Edwards (1999) discusses, it is often the 
case that the private sector circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital 
controls, which can be captured by price-based measures. A drawback of the price-based measures, on the other hand, 
is the measures, especially those based on the interest rate parity conditions, can reflect changes in macroeconomic 
conditions even if there is no regulatory changes on capital account transactions. For categorization of measures on 
financial integration and/or financial openness, refer to Cavoli, et al. (2003) and Takagi and Hirose (2004). 
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is a vector of economic control variables; and Li refers to a measure of legal or institutional 
development.  
The vector X contains macroeconomic control variables that include log per capita income 
in PPP terms, the inflation rate, and trade openness, measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP. In this analysis, the set is kept fairly small so as to retain some interpretability of 
the correlations. Log per capita income is included as there is a long literature ascribing financial 
deepening, aside from the role of regulation, to the increasig complexity of economic structures 
associated with rising income. The inflation rate is included because it may distort decision- 
making.13 In particular, moderate to high inflation may discourage financial intermediation, and 
encourage saving in real assets. Finally, trade openness is included as an ad hoc control; many 
empirical studies find a correlation of trade openness with any number of economic variables. The 
relationship between trade openness and financial openness will be investigated more thoroughly 
in a later section. 
A series of regressions is conducted for each of the four financial development variables 
(FD): PCGDP, SMKC, SMTV, and SMTO. For the series of regressions with different financial 
development measures, I also include each of the four legal/institutional variables and its 
interactive term with the capital account openness index. Further discussions about the 
legal/institutional variables are presented in the data section.  
In order to avoid problems of endogeneity associated with short-term cyclical effects, I 
specify the model as a growth rate on levels regression, akin to a panel error-correction model with 
non-overlapping data. That is, data are sampled only every five years between 1980 and 2000, and 
the five-year average growth of the level of financial development is used as the dependent 
variable and the “initial conditions” for time-variant explanatory variables, including the initial 
level of the financial development indicator, for each five-year panel.14 The regressions are 
conducted for 87 less developed and emerging market countries. 
3.2 The Data 
                                                          
13  Since in most cases, the volatility of inflation rises with the inflation rate, the inflation rate could be proxying for 
either or both of these effects. 
14 Time fixed effects are also included in the model to control for possible time-specific exogenous shocks. 
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The data are originally recorded at an annual frequency, over the 1970-2000 period, 
covering 108 countries and drawn from a number of sources, primarily the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and the databases 
associated with Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).  
Measures of Legal/Institutional Development  
The legal/institutional variables used in this study contain the measures related to the 
general development of legal systems and institutions, namely LEGAL1, Corrupt, LAO, and BQ. 
LEGAL1 is the first principal component of the other three variables, and this variable is treated as 
a representative measure of the general level of legal/institutional development.15 Corrupt, LAO, 
and BQ measure the level of corruption, law and order, and the quality of the bureaucratic system, 
respectively. All of these data series included in LEGAL1 are obtained from the ICRG database. In 
these indexes, higher values indicate better conditions. The data series are available for the period 
of 1984 through 1997, but are included as the period-average. 
Before discussing the regression results, I make one observation. In the following panel 
data analyses, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature, i.e., they 
are time-invariant. The relative shortness of the time series of the ICRG variables makes it difficult 
to include these variables as panel data. As Wei (2000) discusses (on the corruption indices in his 
paper), these types of institutional variables may entail some possibility of biasness. In order to 
circumvent this issue, it is reasonable to use the period average. Also, the inclusion of these 
variables as time-invariant factors should not pose a substantial problem for this study, since these 
characteristics represented by the legal/institutional variables are likely to change only very 
slowly.16 Moreover, I focus mainly on the effect of financial openness on financial development, 
but not the effect of legal/institutional development per se. In other words, rather than shedding 
light on how the development of institutions and legal systems affects financial development, I 
examine how the effect of financial openness changes depending upon the “environment” of 
                                                          
15 The first eigenvector for Legal1 was found to be (Corrupt, LAO,BQ)’ = (0.574, 0.580, 0.578)’, indicating that the 
variability of LEGAL1 is not merely driven by any particular series. 
16 Stulz (1999) and Stiglitz (2000) argue that financial globalization puts pressure on governments to improve legal 
systems and infrastructure for financial markets. However, to my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence for the 
causality.  
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institutions and legal systems. Therefore, time-variation of the legal/institutional variables is not 
critical to this study. 
3.3  Empirical Results 
The regression results for the model specified in equation (1) are reported in Tables 3-1 and 
3-2. The estimated coefficients of focus are those of KAOPENt-5 (first row), the legal variable 
(second row), and the interactive term between the legal variable and KAOPENt-5 (third row). For 
each financial development variable, the regression results are shown for three sample groups: less 
development countries, Asian countries, and non-Asian less developed countries.17 The following 
observations will mainly focus on the regressions with equity market development measures; the 
regressions with stock market capitalization (SMKC) represent financial development in terms of 
the size of stock markets, and the ones with stock market total values (SMTV) represent the 
activeness of the equity markets. The results for the regressions with private credit creation 
(PCGDP) are presented for comparison purposes while those with stock market turnover (SMTO) 
are omitted because the role of the variable overlaps with SMTV. 
Table 3-1 reports the regression results for the models with LEGAL1. In the LDC sample, 
when financial development is measured by stock market total values, financial openness 
(KAOPENt-5) contributes both directly and in an interactive manner with legal and institutional 
development to equity market development. In both the Asian and non-Asian LDC samples, the 
interactive effect between financial openness and legal development is detected. Significant 
coefficients for the interactive term are also found in the models with equity market development 
measured by stock market turnover for LDC and non-Asian LDC subsamples (not reported).  
Here, one must be careful about how to interpret the overall effect of capital account 
openness because it depends on the level of legal development.18 That is, given equation (1), the 
total effect of financial openness can be shown as: 
( ) iti KAOPENL 531 opennessKA  ofEffect  Total −+= γγ , 
where L is the mean of a measure of legal development. For example, when one examines the 
                                                          
17 Since the sample size is small for the Asian subsample, the results for this group are treated as suggestive references. 
18 In case of the regressions with LEGAL1, the fact that the variable can be negative for a lower value also contributes 
to the complexity in the interpretation. 
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regression specifications for the financial development measured in stock market total value for 
LDC group in Table 3-1 (column [7]), the total effect of a one-unit increase in KAOPEN is 
calculated to be –0.06 percent point using the LDC group’s average of LEGAL1, –0.74. If the same 
calculation is conducted for the Asian group using the same coefficients from column [7] but the 
group’s average of LEGAL1, –0.45, the total effect is now 0.24 percent point because the Asian 
group’s average of LEGAL1 is higher than LDC’s. Thus, opening capital accounts can lead to a 
lower or higher rate of development in equity markets, depending upon the level of legal and 
institutional development.  
Table 4 makes this point clear. In this table, row [A] shows the total effect of a one-unit 
increase in KAOPEN calculated using the estimates from the regression model with stock market 
total value for the LDC group, evaluated at the average values of the legal variable for each of the 
sample groups: Latin America, non-Asian LDC, LDC, ASIA, EMG, and Asian EMG (shown in 
row [B]). Row [C] shows the threshold level of the legal variable, above which a one-unit increase 
in capital account openness has a positive impact on equity market development. The table 
illustrates that, in order for capital account openness to contribute to the development of equity 
markets, countries must be possessed of a level of legal/institutional development greater than the 
threshold level of LEGAL1 = –0.68. Hence, among the sample groups, the groups of emerging 
market countries, Asian economies, and Asian emerging market countries (whose average values 
of LEGAL1 exceed the –0.68 threshold) will on average benefit from opening their capital 
accounts. On the other hand, less developed countries, non-Asian LDC, and the Latin American 
group will hamper their equity market development by opening capital accounts. Especially, the 
negative effect of financial opening on the Latin American group is significant because of the low 
level of legal and institutional development. The Asian emerging market countries, on the other 
hand, can develop equity markets considerably by opening their capital accounts.  
As specific examples, Peru increased its financial openness from –1.84 to 2.27 between 
1990 and 1995. Given its LEGAL1 level of –1.65, much lower than the threshold of –0.68, the 
increase in financial openness would reduce the growth rate of stock market total value by 4.1% 
point annually. Thailand, on the other hand, experienced a smaller increase of 1.10 in its KAOPEN 
variable (from 0.15 to 1.25), but because its LEGAL1 level is 0.39, much higher than the threshold 
as well as Peru’s, its SMTV is predicted to grow at an additional 1.2% annually. Given that SMTV 
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grew at 1.99% annually for less developed countries during the 1990s (Table 1), this acceleration 
in the growth rate is significant.  
Figure 3 presents a visual picture of the total effect of an one-unit increase in KAOPEN 
based on each country’s value of LEGAL1 for Asian and Latin American countries. The countries 
are placed in the order of the magnitude of the total effect of an one-unit increase in KAOPEN. The 
countries that have positive effects of financial opening are those which attained a threshold level 
of legal and institutional development such as Malaysia and Korea, whereas countries with 
underdeveloped institutional infrastructure may hamper equity market development.  
Table 3-2 summarizes the results from the regressions that are run with each of the 
components of LEGAL1 (i.e., Corrupt, LAO, and BQ) included individually and interactively. For 
the sake of brevity, the table shows only the coefficients of the financial openness variable, the 
legal/institutional variable, and the interaction term. For the group of less developed countries in 
general, across the different models with different measures of financial development, the 
significance of the estimated coefficients appears to be qualitatively the same as those of the 
regressions with LEGAL1.19 In the Asian subsample, when financial development is measured by 
stock market total values, both the level and interactive terms with KAOPEN are statistically 
significant for the models with Corrupt and LAO (and adjusted R-squares are relatively higher 
than other subgroups). Bureaucratic quality seems to matter for non-Asian less developed 
countries, but not for the Asian countries. Interestingly, the coefficient of KAOPENt-5 alone has a 
negative sign wherever the interactive term has a significant coefficient, suggesting that opening 
financial markets alone may lead to underdevelopment of equity markets, but it can be avoided 
only if the countries are equipped with a reasonable level of legal/institutional development. 
Table 4, again, helps the interpretation of the overall effect of KAOPEN for the models 
with SMTV. Generally, liberalizing capital accounts lead to development in equity markets only 
when the measures against corruption or law and order are higher than the threshold levels (52.2 
and 54.5, respectively). When the level of bureaucratic quality is controlled for, financial openness 
seems to leads to financial development among all subgroups except for Latin America. For the 
                                                          
19 Although the coefficient of KAOPEN is negative in most of the cases when it is significant, this is because, unlike 
LEGAL1, all the three legal/institutional variables in these models do not contain any negative values. However, 
because of the negative coefficients, the argument about the thresholds of legal/institutional variables is valid as was in 
the case of LEGAL1. 
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Asian subgroup (column [4]), it appears that only the average level of bureaucracy quality is high 
enough for the countries in this group to reap from financial liberalization while that is not the case 
with the levels of anti-corruption and law and order. However, as far as Asian emerging market 
countries are concerned, all of these countries’ levels of anti-corruption, law and order, and 
bureaucracy quality are high enough for them to benefit from financial liberalization. As such, I 
can conclude that it is the relatively higher levels of legal and institutional infrastructure that allow 
Asian countries, especially Asian emerging market countries, to reap the benefit from financial 
liberalization and develop their equity markets. This result is consistent with the observations from 
Tables 1 and 2. 
The same exercise is repeated using a different set of legal and institutional variables. The 
new variables pertain particularly to financial transactions, namely, creditor protection 
(CREDITOR), contract enforcement (ENFORCE), shareholder protection (SHRIGHTS), and the 
accounting standards (ACCOUNT), all of which are obtained from LLSV (1997, 1998). I also 
constructed a composite index LEGAL2 which is the first standardized principal component of the 
four variables, and therefore depicts the overall development of the legal system governing 
financial transactions. The regressions using LEGAL2 as the legal/institutional variable yield 
qualitatively the same results as those with LEGAL1. However, the results for the models with 
each of the four LLSV variables included as the legal variable are not as decisive as in the previous 
cases (not reported).20 These findings suggest that it is the development of general legal systems 
and institutions, not of those specific to financial transactions, that is crucial for a country to 
benefit from opening its capital accounts. 
3.4  Robustness Checks 
The above results are obtained from the estimation of a set of non-overlapping five-year 
panels, which has a merit of mitigating endogeneity problems. In addition, this estimation method 
has other advantages. First, it serves to minimize the effect of correlations due to business cycle 
fluctuations because it samples observations data every five years. Second, for the same reason, 
the use of five-year windows allows one to minimize (but does not completely solve) the effect of 
                                                          
20 Due to the data availability of the LLSV variables, the sample of less developed countries is mostly composed of 
emerging market countries. For the same reason, the disaggregated regression analysis for the Asian or non-Asian 
LDC subgroups are not conducted. 
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financial bubbles the financial development indicators may unintentionally capture. As a point of 
reference, it is useful to note that in many studies of lending booms as financial crises indicators, 
changes in lending or stock market sizes over a shorter window, of between 2 to 4 years are, often 
used.21 However, the choice of five years as the length of each window is still arbitrary. Hence, I 
conduct a series of robustness checks regarding the panel windows. In order to conserve space, I 
only summarize the results below. 
First of all, I checked whether the estimation results are specific to the years from which 
data are sampled, i.e., 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. I reran the regressions using the 
non-overlapping data from the years one year before or after the above years (i.e., every five years 
starting in 1979 or 1981). The estimation results are found to be qualitatively unchanged. Second, 
I changed the length of the panel intervals. When the length of the windows is changed to four 
years as well as six years, the estimation results are qualitatively intact, though the estimation 
results become stronger in terms of the key coefficients’ magnitude and significance when the 
length is changed to six years.22 
I also examined whether the above baseline results are sensitive to outliers. It is important to 
check the impact of outliers because the data on financial development can be subject to financial 
bubbles as previously discussed, and also because they can involve some measurement errors. 
First, using the original annual data, I exclude the observations of financial development variables 
if their annual growth rates are two standard deviations away from the mean in both directions, and 
re-estimate the same sets of regressions.23 Generally, in the re-estimated results (not reported), the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients often becomes smaller, but so do the standard errors, 
especially for the models with stock market related measures. Therefore, not only does the 
statistical significance of the coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged, but in addition some of 
                                                          
21 See Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Chinn, Dooley and Shrestha (1999), Kaminsky (2003), Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001b), and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996). 
22 I also conducted the robustness checks by changing the length of the window for the SHARE variable (see Appendix 
2) in the same way as that of the panel windows. When a new KAOPEN variable is calculated using a four-year or 
three-year window for the SHARE variable are used, the estimation results are found to be qualitatively fairly 
unaffected. When both the length of the window for the SHARE variable and the length of panel windows are changed 
in the same way, as long as the change is to either four or six years, the results did not change. 
23 This exercise was conducted only for the sample of less developed countries because the subsamples are small in the 
first place. The exclusion of outliers shrinks the sample size by about 0 – 11% and takes place more for the models 
with stock market total value and stock market turnover than those with private credit creation and stock market 
capitalization, which reflects that the former group are more subject to market volatility than the latter.  
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the coefficients which were previously insignificant become significant. Interestingly, in many 
models the adjusted R-squared increases.24 These results allow me to conclude that the key 
findings of the analysis are not driven by outliers, and also that some of the findings related to the 
legal/institutional variables could have even been obscured by the effects of outliers. 
3.5  Reverse Causality? 
One may reasonably ask if financial development is what allows countries to implement 
financial liberalization policy, rather than the reverse. As has been discussed, non-overlapping, 
five-year panel analysis should mitigate problems associated with simultaneity, but it may still be 
worthwhile to investigate whether countries need to develop their financial systems before 
undertaking capital account liberalization. Conversely, if I can show that reverse causality is 
irrelevant, that will be evidence that countries can develop their financial markets by exogenously 
deciding to open their financial markets. 
To explore the above question, I change the specification in equation (1) by exchanging the 
places of KAOPENt-5 and financial development measures (PCGDP, SMKC, SMTV, and SMTO); 
the left-hand side variable is now the five-year average growth in KAOPEN while the independent 
variables of focus now becomes the financial development variable and the interactive terms 
between the legal/institutional variables and the financial development variables. I run regressions 
specified as follows, using non-overlapping data and including each of the legal/institutional 
variables: 
(2) ( )  553251505 itititiiitititit XFDLLFDKAOPENKAOPENKAOPEN νφφφϕφ +Φ+×++++=− −−−−− . 
The coefficient of interest is 1φ ; A significantly positive 1φ  would indicate that the above OLS 
regression results entail simultaneous causality, i.e., financial development leads to financial 
openness. The regression results (not reported) show that across different sample groups and 
regressions with different financial development measures as well as legal/institutional variables, 
the coefficients, 1φ ’s, are mostly statistically insignificant or significantly negative, either of 
                                                          
24 The same exercise is then repeated, but increasing the range of outlier exclusion by dropping the observations if 
their annual growth rates are larger than one and a half standard deviations away from the mean in both directions. 
This exclusion shrinks the sample size quite substantially (sometimes as much as 40%), although the results are 
largely unchanged or even improved. 
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which is against the null hypothesis that financial development leads to financial openness. The 
significantly negative 1φ ’s are found in the regressions that have the dependent variable of the 
equity market development measures. One of the possible explanations for the negative 1φ  may be 
that a rapid growth in equity markets, in terms of the size of the markets (SMKC) or the liquidity of 
the markets (SMTV or SMTO) is sometimes associated with financial crises, and that policy makers 
lower the degree of financial openness during periods of crisis (Ito, 2004). At the very least, I can 
conclude that the baseline estimation results are not subject to obvious simultaneity issues (as in 
Bekaert, et al., 2001).  
 
4. Investigating the Sequence of Liberalization  
 
4.1  Trade and Capital Account Liberalization 
The next question is whether trade openness is a precondition for financial opening. This is 
the optimal sequence question, which has been raised by many, including, most notably, 
McKinnon (1991). According to McKinnon’s hypothesis, liberalizing capital accounts is the last 
step of economic liberalization and must be implemented only if trade openness is achieved.  
Although this hypothesis has been influential, empirical evidence has been mixed. 
Haggard and Maxfield (1993) shows that trade openness is a precondition for removing capital 
controls whereas Leblang (1997) does not find any evidence for the influence from trade openness 
on capital account liberalization. Aizenman and Noy (2004) find that financial openness and trade 
openness are bidirectional, though financial openness seems to lead to trade openness more than 
the other way around. Tornell et al. (2004) also show that financial liberalization has typically 
followed trade liberalization over the last two decades.  
Recently, the sequencing issue is getting more attention in the Asian region because of the 
efforts for regional economic integration. Table 5 reports the correlations between the index for 
financial openness, KAOPEN, and that for trade openness, TRADEOPEN, whose definition will be 
explained more carefully below. In this table, the link between financial and trade openness is 
exceptionally high for Asia than any other groups. The high correlation also appears to be stable 
throughout the three decades.  
I empirically explore the hypothesis of trade openness being a precondition for financial 
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opening by employing a simple model that accounts for the determinants of financial openness or 
restrictions. As stated in equation (3), I model financial openness as the function of government 
budget surplus, international reserves, trade openness, and per capita GDP.25  
(3)  tttttt ZTRADEOPENKAOPENKAOPEN νξξξ +Ξ+++= −−−− 5|152510 , 
where Zt-1|t-5 is a vector of macroeconomic control variables , namely, government budget surplus, 
international reserves, and per capita GDP.26 I select two variables – the government budget 
surplus and international reserves – since they are most commonly argued as the determinants of 
capital controls.27,28 The variable for per capita GDP is also included to control for the level of 
development of the economic system. Since these variables are supposed to control for the general 
trend of macro variables, they are included as the 5-year average prior to the time period t (as 
shown as (t-1|t-5) in the regression results table). 
As the trade openness variable, I use a new variable TRADEOPEN which is a reciprocal of 
the weighted average (based on the share of imports and exports in total trade) of duties imposed 
on both imports and exports.29 Because the relationship between trade openness and KAOPEN 
which essentially measures de jure openness in cross-border financial transactions is of most 
interest here, TRADEOPEN, an index on de jure trade openness, is more appropriate than opn (the 
sum of exports and imports divided by GDP), which is used in the previous estimations and 
measures de facto trade openness.  
                                                          
25 The empirical model also controls for regional differences by regional dummies.  
26 The variable for gross international reserves is a proxy to the balance of payments situation of the countries and is 
measured by gross international reserves in months of imports. The lower gross reserves in months of imports, the 
higher prevalence of balance of payments concerns are. The data are extracted from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  
27 Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) show that capital controls have strong fiscal implications, i.e., countries with a less 
developed tax system tend to implement capital controls as the source of government revenue as well as the remedy to 
capital flows caused by the inflation-driven distortions in the financial markets. Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) find 
that countries tend to implement capital controls, the more prevalent the balance of payments concerns are. For more 
discussion of the macroeconomic determinants of capital controls, refer to Leblang (1997). 
28 In addition to the above variables, I included variables that refer to the government engagement in seigniorage, such 
as the inflation rate or the reserve ratio. However, these measures of seigniorage can cause multicollinearity in 
regression analysis due to its correlation with the level of government budget surplus, the reverse of which is often the 
reason for seigniorage. Therefore, I decided not to include seigniorage-related variables in the regression model. 
Because the analysis in this subsection also functions as a preliminary analysis for the two stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation in the next subsection, I maintain the estimation model as parsimonious as possible. 
29 Import and export duties as a ratio to imports and exports, respectively, are available from the World Bank’s WDI. 
The higher (or close to 100) TRADEOPEN is, the less duties imposed on trade flows in both directions, i.e., the more 
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I also test whether the reverse causality, i.e., financial openness leads to trade openness, 
holds. To maintain the parsimony of the model, the places for KAOPEN and TRADEOPEN in 
equation (3) are switched for the regression analysis. Considering that tariff policy is often 
motivated by the fiscal conditions of countries, it is reasonable to keep the term for budget balance 
in the regression equation. However, the variable for international reserves is not retained because 
it lacks a theoretical motivation. 
In order to minimize the possibility of two-way causality, in both types of regressions, I 
employ a non-overlapping panel data analysis as in previous analyses. While the macro variables 
are included as the five-year average, both KAOPEN and TRADEOPEN are included as the initial 
conditions of each five-year panel. In the empirical analysis, we focus on the coefficient 2ξ  (or the 
coefficient of the five-year lagged financial openness for the other type of regression) to see if the 
trade openness can be a precondition for financial opening, or the reversed causality is true. 
The first three columns of Table 6 report the results for the regressions on whether trade 
openness leads to financial openness. While the average budget surplus and GDP per capita enter 
significantly, but not international reserves, the trade openness variable seems to significantly 
contribute to the level of financial openness in all sample groups, indicating that the openness in 
goods transactions is a precondition for financial openness. Interestingly, when the same exercise 
is repeated for the group of Latin American countries (not reported), the coefficient of the trade 
openness variable becomes insignificant with a large drop in the p-value.  
Columns (4) through (6) of Table 6 show the results on whether the reverse causality also 
holds. In all the samples, the financial openness variable does not enter significantly. Hence, I can 
safely conclude that the more openness in goods transactions can lead to a more openness in 
capital account, but the reverse causality does not appear to be present.  
4.2  Endogeneity and the Sequence of Liberalization 
Taking a cue from the results reported above, I implement two stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation instrumenting the KAOPENt-5 variable in equation (1) to investigate whether financial 
opening preceded by trade opening leads to financial development. The instrumental variables are 
the initial conditions of financial and trade openness five years prior to the variable as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
open trade flows are by regulation. 
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government budget surplus and GDP per capita as the five-year average prior to t-5 and regional 
dummies.30  
The results of applying 2SLS to a model that controls for the general development level of 
legal systems and institutions (LEGAL1) are reported in Table 7. For the model with stock market 
total value (SMTV) of the group of less developed countries, we can see that both the magnitude 
and the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients for the level KAOPEN, LEGAL1, and 
interactive terms increase. For the Asian sample, the interactive term remains significant while the 
level KAOPEN term does not (the p-value is 29%). For the SMKC models, the level of financial 
openness becomes significant contributors to equity market development for both the LDC and 
Asian groups. Given these results, we may conclude that financial opening succeeding trading 
opening leads to equity market development especially when it takes place in an economy with a 
reasonably developed legal system. This conclusion is applicable to the Asian sample with a 
somewhat lesser degree. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examined the nexus between capital account liberalization and financial 
development with a focus on the Asian region. A casual examination of summary statistics showed 
that in recent decades this region has achieved high growth in both equity market development as 
well as the level of openness toward cross-border financial transactions. Given this observation, I 
investigated a question which policy makers in the Asian region are contemplating, that is, “what 
is the ‘right way’ of implementing liberalization?” Despite its intrinsic interest, there has not been 
much empirical work aimed at answering this question. This paper addresses that deficiency.  
Specifically, two issues are examined. First, what kind of institutional settings have made financial 
liberalization successful in fostering financial, especially equity, market development in Asia as 
well as other less developed countries? Secondly, this paper investigated whether there is 
empirical evidence to support the McKinnon hypothesis on the optimal sequence of liberalization, 
i.e., trade openness should precede financial openness. 
                                                          
30 The international reserves variable is not included because of its insignificance in the previous analysis. The 
regional dummies are not included as IVs for the Asia and non-Asian LDC subsamples.  
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On the first point, the empirical results suggest that financial openness does contribute to 
equity market development – measured as activity of the stock market – but only when a threshold 
level of general development of legal systems and institutions has been attained, a condition which 
is more prevalent among Asian countries, especially emerging market Asian countries, than 
among the entire set of developing countries.31 When the specific effects of legal/institutional 
development are examined, a higher level of bureaucratic quality and law and order, as well as a 
lower level of corruption, are found to enhance the effect of financial opening in fostering the 
development of equity markets. For the Asian set of countries, corruption and law and order appear 
to matter for equity market development while the quality of bureaucracy does not. Interestingly, 
finance-specific legal institutions do not seem to fulfill the same role, indicating that the general 
level of legal development matters more than the level of finance-specific legal/institutional 
development. These results are robust to the presence of outliers in the data and simultaneity as 
well as to different model specifications, so I conclude that increasing the level of openness in 
cross-border financial transactions – when a reasonable level of legal and institutional 
development is achieved – can lead to development in equity markets.  
On the McKinnon hypothesis, the opening of goods markets is found to be a precondition 
for financial opening in less developed sample as well as the Asian subsample. However, the 
reverse causal link does not hold for any of the sample groups. When the financial openness 
variable is instrumented with trade openness, the contribution of the general level of legal 
development still remains significant for the group of less developed countries and with a 
somewhat lesser degree for the Asian sample. I interpret this finding as evidence that an increase in 
trade openness is a prolog to financial openness, and thence to financial development.  
These findings suggest that the uniquely high level of equity market development in the 
Asian region can be explained by the policy of financial openness in the presence of a highly 
developed legal infrastructure as well as trade openness.
                                                          
31 This finding is consistent with Klein (2005) who argues that the effectiveness of capital account liberalization on 
economic growth is non-monotonic and depends upon the level of institutional quality. Klein, however, demonstrates 
that the relationship between institutional quality and the responsiveness of economic growth to capital account 
liberalization is inverted-U shaped; countries with better (but not the best) institutions exhibit a statistically significant 
effect of capital account openness on economic growth. 
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Appendix 1: Country list (108 
countries) 
Asia (15) 
1 513 BGD Bangladesh e 
2 924 CHN China e 
3 819 FJI Fiji  
4 532 HKG Hong Kong e 
5 534 IND India e 
6 536 IDN Indonesia e 
7 542 KOR Korea e 
8 548 MYS Malaysia e 
9 558 NPL Nepal  
10 564 PAK Pakistan e 
11 853 PNG Papua New Guinea  
12 566 PHL Philippines e 
13 576 SGP Singapore e 
14 524 LKA Sri Lanka e 
15 578 THA Thailand e 
 
Other countries (93) 
1 612 DZA Algeria  
2 213 ARG Argentina e 
3 193 AUS Australia i  
4 122 AUT Austria i  
5 313 BHS Bahamas, The 
6 419 BHR Bahrain, Kingdom of e 
7 316 BRB Barbados  
8 124 BEL Belgium i  
9 339 BLZ Belize  
10 638 BEN Benin  
11 218 BOL Bolivia  
12 616 BWA Botswana e 
13 223 BRA Brazil e 
14 748 BFA Burkina Faso  
15 618 BDI Burundi  
16 622 CMR Cameroon  
17 156 CAN Canada i  
18 626 CAF Central African Rep.  
19 628 TCD Chad  
20 228 CHL Chile e 
21 233 COL Colombia e 
22 634 COG Congo, Republic of  
23 238 CRI Costa Rica  
24 662 CIV Cote d'Ivoire e 
25 423 CYP Cyprus  
26 128 DNK Denmark i  
27 243 DOM Dominican Republic  
28 248 ECU Ecuador e 
29 469 EGY Egypt e 
30 253 SLV El Salvador  
31 172 FIN Finland i  
32 132 FRA France i  
33 646 GAB Gabon  
34 648 GMB Gambia, The  
35 134 DEU Germany i  
36 652 GHA Ghana e 
37 174 GRC Greece i, e 
38 258 GTM Guatemala  
39 263 HTI Haiti  
40 268 HND Honduras  
41 176 ISL Iceland i 
42 429 IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. of  
43 178 IRL Ireland i  
44 436 ISR Israel e 
45 136 ITA Italy i  
46 343 JAM Jamaica e 
47 158 JPN Japan i  
48 439 JOR Jordan e 
49 664 KEN Kenya e 
50 443 KWT Kuwait 
51 666 LSO Lesotho  
52 674 MDG Madagascar  
53 676 MWI Malawi  
54 678 MLI Mali  
55 181 MLT Malta  
56 682 MRT Mauritania  
57 684 MUS Mauritius e 
58 273 MEX Mexico e 
59 686 MAR Morocco e 
60 138 NLD Netherlands i  
61 196 NZL New Zealand i  
62 278 NIC Nicaragua  
63 692 NER Niger  
64 694 NGA Nigeria e 
65 142 NOR Norway i  
66 449 OMN Oman e 
67 283 PAN Panama  
68 288 PRY Paraguay  
69 293 PER Peru e 
70 182 PRT Portugal i, e 
71 714 RWA Rwanda  
72 456 SAU Saudi Arabia e 
73 722 SEN Senegal  
74 718 SYC Seychelles  
75 724 SLE Sierra Leone  
76 199 ZAF South Africa e 
77 184 ESP Spain i  
78 734 SWZ Swaziland  
79 144 SWE Sweden i  
80 146 CHE Switzerland i  
81 463 SYR Syrian Arab Republic  
82 738 TZA Tanzania  
83 742 TGO Togo  
84 369 TTO Trinidad and Tobago e 
85 744 TUN Tunisia e 
86 186 TUR Turkey e 
87 746 UGA Uganda  
88 112 GBR United Kingdom i  
89 111 USA United States i  
90 298 URY Uruguay  
91 299 VEN Venezuela, Rep. Bol. e 
92 754 ZMB Zambia  
93 698 ZWE Zimbabwe e 
i – industrialized countries (IDC), 22 countries 
e – emerging market countries (EMG), 31 countries 
(Standard & Poor (2000)) 
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Appendix 2:  The “Chinn-Ito” Index 
KAOPEN is an index to measure a country’s degree of capital account openness. The dataset 
encompasses the time period of 1970-2000 for 108 countries. For a complete list of the 
countries, see the attached country list. 
Construction of KAOPEN 
KAOPEN is based on the four binary dummy variables reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are to provide 
information on the extent and nature of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide 
cross-section of countries. These variables are: 
• k1: variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates; 
• k2: variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions; 
• k3: variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions; and  
• k4: variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. 
In order to focus on the effect of financial openness – rather than controls – we reverse the 
values of these binary variables, such that the variables are equal to one when the capital 
account restrictions are non-existent. Moreover, for controls on capital transitions (k3), we use 
the share of a five-year window (encompassing year t and the preceding four years) that capital 

















Then we construct an index for capital “openness” (KAOPENt), which is the first standardized 
principal component of k1t, k2t SHAREk3, k4t.32 This index takes on higher values the more open 
the country is to cross-border capital transactions. By construction, the series has a mean of zero. 
The first eigenvector for KAOPEN was found to be (SHAREk3, k1, k2, k4)’ = (0.573, 0.273, 0.521, 
0.571)’, indicating that the variability of KAOPEN is not merely driven by the SHAREk3 series. 
 
We incorporate the k1,t, k2,t, and k4,t variables in our KAOPEN variable instead of focusing on k3 
which refers to restrictions on capital account transactions. We believe the incorporation of k1,t, 
k2,t, and k4,t in this index allows us to more accurately capture the intensity of the capital 
controls. This point can be made more concrete by considering a country with an open capital 
account. It may still restrict the flow of capital by limiting transactions on the current account 
restrictions or other systems such as multiple exchange rates and requirements to surrender 
export proceeds. Alternatively, countries that already have closed capital accounts might try to 
increase the stringency of those controls by imposing k1, k2, and k4 types of restrictions so that 
the private sector cannot circumvent the capital account restrictions.  
 
                                                          
32 For the extension of the four binary variables after the disaggregation of the AREAER classification in 1996, we 
followed Mody and Murshid (2005). 
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By the nature of its construction, one may argue that the KAOPEN index measures the extensity 
of capital controls because it may not directly refer to the stringency of restrictions on 
cross-border transactions, but to the existence of different types of restrictions. However, 
measuring the extensity of capital controls may be a good proxy to the measure of intensity of 
capital controls. One might think of the Quinn (1997) index or the Miniane (2004) index as the 
measures of the intensity of capital controls. The correlation between the Chinn-Ito index and 
the Quinn or Miniane index is found to be 83.9% and 80.2%, respectively, suggesting that 
KAOPEN is proxying the intensity of capital controls.  
 
Clearly, the measurement of the extent of capital account controls is a difficult enterprise. Many 
researchers have tried to capture the complexity of real-world capital controls, with varying 
degrees of success, and varying degrees of coverage. For reviews and comparisons of various 
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Table 1: Growth rates of PCGDP, SMKC, SMTV, and SMTO 
1970 – 2000 and decades 
 Growth rates of 





Stock Market  
Turnover 
 (PCGDP) (SMKC) (SMTV) (SMTO) 
1970 – 2000 
Full 0.87% 1.93% 1.87% 2.47% 
IDC 1.74% 2.96% 3.67% 3.45% 
LDC 0.61% 1.32% 0.84% 1.87% 
EMG 0.91% 1.49% 1.09% 2.49% 
Asia 1.17% 1.67% 1.86% 3.89% 
Non-Asian LDC 0.48% 1.15% 0.40% 0.94% 
Latin America 0.60% 1.16% 0.08% –0.03% 
1970 – 1979 
Full 0.62% 0.47% 0.18% 0.35% 
IDC 0.77% –0.22% 0.25% –0.35% 
LDC 0.57% 1.70% 0.11% 1.85% 
EMG 0.70% 1.29% 0.09% 1.55% 
Asia 0.78% 1.14% –0.02% 0.40% 
Non-Asian LDC 0.52% 2.52% 0.21% 4.10% 
Latin America 0.48% 0.64% 0.15% 7.17% 
1980 – 1989 
Full 0.68% 1.52% 1.33% 1.98% 
IDC 1.99% 2.89% 2.25% 3.61% 
LDC 0.30% 0.53% 0.70% 0.78% 
EMG 0.49% 0.70% 0.82% 1.16% 
Asia 1.06% 0.61% 1.79% 1.98% 
Non-Asian LDC 0.14% 0.48% 0.14% 0.08% 
Latin America –0.01% 0.21% 0.07% 0.05% 
1990 – 2000 
Full 1.08% 3.33% 3.72% 3.81% 
IDC 1.95% 5.59% 7.51% 4.40% 
LDC 0.85% 2.27% 1.99% 3.53% 
EMG 1.35% 2.66% 3.00% 5.14% 
Asia 1.46% 3.50% 5.07% 9.84% 
Non-Asian LDC 0.71% 1.78% 0.84% 1.05% 
Latin America 1.30% 1.80% 0.16% –0.05% 
1995 – 2000 
Full 1.58% 3.03% 4.81% 5.08% 
IDC 3.10% 9.50% 12.06% 6.52% 
LDC 1.19% 0.25% 1.66% 4.45% 
EMG 1.78% –0.39% 2.83% 7.30% 
Asia 1.81% –1.78% 3.95% 15.04% 
Non-Asian LDC 1.05% 0.99% 0.85% 0.62% 
Latin America 1.59% 0.75% –0.33% –1.06% 
Notes: For the data description, refer to the text. The original data are extracted from the 
updated version of the Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) dataset. 
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Tale 2: Averages of KAOPEN and change in KAOPEN,  
1970 – 2000 and decades 
 
 Averages of KAOPEN 
 1970 – 2000 1970s 1980s 1990s 1995 – 2000
Full 0.000  –0.278  –0.296  0.485  0.679 
IDC 1.125  0.257  0.804  2.152  2.407 
LDC –0.288  –0.424  –0.570  0.069  0.241 
EMG –0.255  –0.547  –0.571  0.274  0.555 
Asia –0.004  –0.375  –0.010  0.292  0.227 
Non-Asia LDC –0.348  –0.434  –0.688  0.021  0.244 
Latin America –0.085  0.075  –0.779  0.402  0.857 
Notes: KAOPEN is an index for the openness in capital account transactions and is the first 
standardized principal component of SHAREk3, k1, k2, and k4. k1 indicates the presence of 
multiple exchange rates; k2 indicates restrictions on current account transactions; k3 indicates 
restrictions on capital account transactions; and k4indicates the requirement of the surrender of 
export proceeds. In order to focus on the effect of financial openness – rather than controls – we 
reverse the values of these binary variables, such that the variables are equal to one when the 
capital account restrictions are non-existent. The first eigenvector for KAOPEN was found to be 
(SHAREk3, k1, k2, k4)’ = (0.573, 0.273, 0.521, 0.571)’, indicating that the variability of KAOPEN 
is not merely driven by the SHAREk3 series. The average of KAOPEN across countries over the 
full time period is zero by construction. See Appendix 2 for more details. 
. 
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Table 3-1: Financial Development, Financial Openness, and Legal/Institutional Development  
(LEGAL1: General Legal/Institutional Development) 
LDC, ASIA, and non-Asian LDC: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
  Private Credit Stock Market Capitalization Stock Market Total Value 
 Pred. LDC Asia Non-Asia LDC Asia Non-Asia LDC Asia Non-Asia
  sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LEGAL1 
         
Financial Openness [t-5] (+) 0.0447 -0.1419 -0.0437 0.4986 3.0844 -0.9067 0.703 0.7472 0.5294 
  [0.1296] [0.3090] [0.1474] [0.7752] [2.8382] [0.5497]* [0.4230]* [1.3888] [0.3357]12%
LEVEL: LEGAL1 (+) 0.1112 0.7114 -0.0647 1.2558 1.8835 0.8404 0.9125 1.2868 0.6971 
  [0.1409] [0.5253] [0.1521] [0.8066]12% [1.5713] [0.9218] [0.5343]* [1.4159] [0.4838]
INTERACTION:  (+) -0.089 -0.1283 -0.1317 0.3698 1.6174 -0.443 1.0252 1.5588 0.7238 
LEGAL1x Fin. Open. [t-5]  [0.0952] [0.2773] [0.1117] [0.4335] [1.3431] [0.6056] [0.3454]*** [0.8315]* [0.4355]*
Financial Deepening [t-5] (–) 0.0001 -0.0149 -0.0048 -0.0493 -0.0500 -0.0491 0.0795 -0.1548 0.1191 
  [0.0119] [0.0242] [0.0136] [0.0380] [0.0719] [0.0278]* [0.1187] [0.1197] [0.1585]
            
Per Capita Income [t-5] (+) 0.0031 0.0089 0.0042 0.0187 0.0038 0.0263 0.0128 0.0790 0.0091 
  [0.0015]** [0.0098] [0.0014]*** [0.0126] [0.0348] [0.0157]* [0.0123] [0.0516] [0.0122]
Inflation [t-5] (–) -0.0047 -0.0194 -0.0013 -0.0497 0.2264 -0.0496 -0.0221 -0.0290 0.0079 
  [0.0074] [0.0452] [0.0075] [0.0303]* [0.2805] [0.0288]* [0.0317] [0.2145] [0.0182]
Trade Openness [t-5] (+) 0.0033 -0.0038 0.0068 0.0137 -0.0176 0.0183 -0.0266 -0.0526 -0.0028 
  [0.0035] [0.0065] [0.0046] [0.0142] [0.0417] [0.0176] [0.0158]* [0.0335] [0.0127]
            
N  289 57 232 101 37 64 115 40 75 
Adj. R-sq.  0.09 0.00 0.10 0.2 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.11 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth 
rate over a five year period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects 
(estimates not reported). Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal 
significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level.  
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Table 3-2: Financial Development, Financial Openness, and Legal/Institutional Development  
(Components of LEGAL1: Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy Quality) 
LDC, ASIA, and non-Asian LDC: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
  Private Credit Stock Market Capitalization Stock Market Total Value 
 Pred LDC Asia Non-Asia LDC Asia Non-Asia LDC Asia Non-Asia
  sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: Corruption (CORRUPT)        
Financial Openness [t-5] (+) 0.0878 0.4958 0.0764 -1.1227 -3.857 1.227 -3.13 -4.9713 -2.7148 
  [0.3771] [1.1722] [0.3606] [1.3328] [2.7091] [2.1175] [1.1015]*** [2.3002]** [1.5231]*
LEVEL: CORRUPT (+) -0.0012 0.0527 -0.0047 0.1382 0.16 0.0599 0.0386 0.0489 0.0545 
  [0.0091] [0.0412] [0.0092] [0.0652]** [0.1197] [0.0755] [0.0393] [0.1074] [0.0406]
INTERACTION:  (+) 0.0005 -0.0105 0.0006 0.0308 0.1261 -0.0357 0.0617 0.092 0.0539 
Corrupt x Fin. Opn. [t-5]  [0.0071] [0.0199] [0.0070] [0.0301] [0.0815]13% [0.0386] [0.0208]*** [0.0513]* [0.0292]*
N  289 57 232 101 37 64 115 40 75 
Adj. R-sq.  0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.12 
Legal/Inst. Variable: Law and order (LAO)      
  
Financial Openness [t-5] (+) 0.4004 0.1669 0.4575 -2.167 -3.7826 -0.3286 -2.178 -7.4869 -0.1451 
  [0.2904] [0.6446] [0.3299] [1.2516]* [3.5459] [1.5821] [1.1883]* [2.8449]** [0.8153]
LEVEL: LAO (+) 0.0076 0.0545 -0.004 0.0424 0.1142 -0.0121 0.0271 0.0603 -0.0039 
  [0.0087] [0.0262]** [0.0091] [0.0393] [0.1030] [0.0384] [0.0316] [0.1052] [0.0210]
INTERACTION:  (+) -0.006 -0.008 -0.0076 0.0433 0.0899 -0.0087 0.0393 0.125 0.0012 
LAO x Fin. Opn. [t-5]  [0.0056] [0.0091] [0.0062] [0.0290] [0.0834] [0.0325] [0.0231]* [0.0581]** [0.0155]
N  289 57 232 101 37 64 115 40 75 
Adj. R-sq.  0.09 0.02 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.02 
Legal/Inst. Variable: Bureaucracy Quality (BQ)      
  
Financial Openness [t-5] (+) 0.477 0.1101 0.6222 0.5654 0.9428 0.264 -2.6769 -2.6124 -2.1773 
  [0.3219] [1.2406] [0.3338]* [1.0655] [1.9570] [1.7634] [1.2885]** [2.9960] [1.2338]*
LEVEL: BQ (+) 0.0066 0.014 -0.0037 0.0291 -0.0211 0.061 0.0672 0.0338 0.0662 
  [0.0088] [0.0236] [0.0095] [0.0503] [0.0643] [0.0806] [0.0387]* [0.0836] [0.0361]*
INTERACTION:  (+) -0.0076 -0.0034 -0.0124 -0.0082 -0.0182 -0.0135 0.0566 0.0333 0.0477 
BQ x Fin. Opn. [t-5]  [0.0063] [0.0211] [0.0069]* [0.0205] [0.0613] [0.0328] [0.0267]** [0.0776] [0.0243]**
N  289 57 232 101 37 64 115 40 75 
Adj. R-sq.  0.10 -0.06 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.19 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual 
growth rate over a five year period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time 
effects (estimates not reported). Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates 
marginal significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level. 
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Table 4: Total effects on the Growth in Stock Market Total Value (% point) 
of a one-unit increase in KAOPEN  
  Latin America
non-Asia
LDC LDC ASIA EMG 
Asian
EMG
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
[A] Total effect of KA Openness –0.40 –0.12 –0.06 0.24 0.41 0.43 
[B] L  (Legal1) –1.07 –0.80 –0.74 –0.45 –0.28 –0.26
[C] Threshold level of Legal1 –0.68 
[A] Total effect of KA Openness –0.37 –0.19 –0.17 –0.11 0.15 0.08 
[B] L  (Corrupt) 45.95 49.04 49.27 50.32 54.73 53.54
[C] Threshold level of Corrupt 52.2 
[A] Total effect of KA Openness –0.27 –0.18 –0.15 –0.00 0.05 0.09 
[B] L  (Law and Order) 47.85 50.05 50.85 54.49 55.76 56.68
[C] Threshold level of LAO 54.5 
[A] Total effect of KA Openness –0.18 0.14 0.24 0.67 0.71 0.79 
[B] L  (Bureaucracy Quality) 41.61 47.07 48.66 55.87 56.44 57.91
[C] Threshold level of BQ 44.7 
Notes:  “Total Effect” [A] indicates the total effect of a one-unit increase in KAOPEN when the legal/institutional 
variable takes the value of the average in the subsample group ( L , shown in [B]). The estimation model is based on 
equation (1) using the data of the LDC subgroup for the regressions with legal variables (column [7] in Table 3-1). 
Rows [C] show the threshold level of the legal variable above which the capital account openness has a positive 
impact on financial development.  
 
Table 5: Correlations between Financial Openness (KAOPEN)  
and Trade Openness (TRADEOPEN) among different sample groups and decades 
 Correlations between Financial and Trade Openness 
 1970 – 2000 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Full 0.49 0.37 0.44 0.56 
IDC 0.37 0.24 0.23 0.21 
LDC 0.37 0.29 0.34 0.40 
EMG 0.38 0.35 0.27 0.41 
Asia 0.60 0.52 0.62 0.55 
Non-Asia LDC  0.31 0.26 0.26 0.36 
Latin America 0.28 0.11 0.17 0.42 
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Table 6: Determinants of Capital Account and Trade Openness 
LDC, ASIA, and non-Asian LDC: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
 
Dependent Variable:  Financial Openness (t) Trade Openness (t) 
 Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sign LDC Asia Non-Asian LDC LDC Asia Non-Asian LDC
Financial Openness (t-5) + 0.5582 0.5457 0.5736 0.0019 0.0026 0.0001 
  [0.0788]*** [0.1346]*** [0.0998]*** [0.0022] [0.0030] [0.0025] 
Trade Openness (t-5) + 2.0171 3.7723 2.4840 0.5633 0.7828 0.5001 
  [1.0772]*6% [2.2915]* [1.4126]* [0.0857]*** [0.1310]*** [0.1032]*** 
Avg. Budget Surplus (t-1|t-5) + 0.0534 -0.0674 0.0722 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0002 
  [0.0180]*** [0.0375]* [0.0196]*** [0.0007] [0.0014] [0.0007] 
Avg. Total reserves (t-1|t-5) + 0.0022 0.0737 -0.0111    
  [0.0309] [0.0683] [0.0350]    
Avg. GDP per capita (t-1|t-5) + 0.2157 0.6603 0.0967 0.0196 0.0106 0.0196 
  [0.1169]* [0.2314]*** [0.1392] [0.0047]*** [0.0081] [0.0058]*** 
Number of Observations  184 52 129 151 44 107 
Adjusted R2  0.44 0.67 0.35 0.63 0.79 0.58 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Budget surplus, total reserves, and GDP 
per capita are included at the average over t-1 through t-5. Constant and regional fix effects (time fixed effects for the Asian sample) are also 
included in the regression, but their estimated coefficients are not reported. The regression estimations are conducted in non-overlapping manners 




Table 7: Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis  
Instrumented by per capita output, budget balance, and trade openness¶ 
LEGAL1 (General Legal/Institutional Development) 
LDC, ASIA, and non-Asian LDC: Five year panels, 1980-2000 
   Private Credit Stock Market Capitalization Stock Market Total Value 
 Pred. LDC Asia Non-Asia LDC Asia Non-Asia LDC Asia Non-Asia
  sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Legal/Inst. Variable: LEGAL1       
Financial Openness [t-5] (+) -0.0033 -0.6260 0.1150 1.8637  2.8886 3.8314 2.1115 1.3145 1.6182 
  [0.3291] [0.7949] [0.6265] [0.9400]** [1.0835]*** [2.8627] [0.7569]*** [1.2216] [1.6016] 
LEVEL: LEGAL1 (+) 0.000571 1.1015 -0.1955 2.6474  1.9252 3.6620 1.1623 2.7263 1.5867 
  [0.2504] [0.8603] [0.2722] [0.9179]*** [1.3415] [2.4412] [0.5740]** [1.0729]** [1.3780] 
INTERACT.:  (+) -0.0305 -0.2158 -0.0563 0.4329 1.0339 1.2993 1.1257 1.0282 1.2249 
LEGAL1x Fin. Open. [t-5]  [0.1499] [0.3634] [0.3270] [0.5091] [0.6213]11% [1.6665] [0.3715]*** [0.4479]** [0.8932] 
Financial Deepening [t-5] (–) 0.0257 0.0133 0.0250 -0.0805 -0.1052 -0.0493 -0.1180 -0.2430 0.1171 
  [0.0162] [0.0523] [0.0135]* [0.0326]** [0.0257]*** [0.0597] [0.0777] [0.0713]*** [0.1870] 
            
Inflation [t-5] (–) -0.005 -0.0210 -0.0028 -0.0508 0.0664 -0.0657 0.0196 0.0343 0.0113 
  [0.0102] [0.0584] [0.0109] [0.0293]* [0.1854] [0.0532] [0.0319] [0.1426] [0.0180] 
            
N  117 35 82 77 31 46 83 32 51 
R-sq.  0.17 0.27 0.20 0.29 0.55  0.04 0.25 0.27 
 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth 
rate over a five year period. Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). Regressions include fixed time effects 
(estimates not reported). Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. (*)[**]{***} indicates marginal 
significance at the (10%)[5%]{1%} level.  
¶- The variable for financial openness lagged five years (KAOPENt-5) is instrumented by per capita output and budget balance, both of 
which are included as the average over the five years prior to five years before each window (i.e., t-10 through t-6 since the IV is already 
lagged five years), regional dummies, and the level of financial openness and trade openness, both of which are lagged ten years. 
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Figure 2: Development of Capital Account Openness, 1970 – 2000:  
ASIA, non-Asian LDC, Latin America 
year
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Figure 3: Total Effect of an One-unit Increase in Capital Account Openness  
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